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Essay
10/6/03
From Violent Crime to Terrorism: The Changing Basis of the Federal, State and Local
Law Enforcement Dynamic
By Daniel Richman∗
Two lines of questions dominate discussions about how the nation ought to
respond at home to the new (or rather newly perceived) terrorist threat: How do we
ensure that information about potential terrorist activities is effectively gathered, shared,
and used? And how do we ensure that the Government neither abuses the investigative
authority we give it, nor demands more authority than it needs? (One’s priorities and risk
assessments may affect the order in which one poses these questions.) The legislative
hearings and expert debates on these two issues sound quite different. Understandably
so, for each has a distinct conceptual center of gravity. The first sparks aspirations of
“connected dots,” “broken walls,” and eliminated “stovepipes.” The second provokes
arguments about accountability and the proper balance between individual liberties
(broadly, and even extralegally defined).
Each line can profitably be pursued in its own terms. Yet to keep the
conversations separate is to miss seeing how the very process of creating an effective
domestic intelligence network may introduce a salutary level of accountability and
balance in the system. The key lies in the relationships among the local, state, and
federal units out of which the network must be created, and their organic characteristics.
And the seeds of this promising institutional dynamic can be found in the recent history
of the interaction among federal, state, and local governments in the policing area.
The Pre-9/11 Violent Crime Dynamic
It has long been a truism that, in our federal system, episodic violent crime is the
province of state and local authorities. And usually local authorities at that, for very few
states have integrated law enforcement hierarchies. It is therefore local police, working
with local district attorneys, and county sheriffs, working with county attorneys, who
have primary responsibility for keeping the streets and roads safe, and going after rapists,
robbers, and murderers.
This responsibility has been enshrined in Supreme Court rulings,1 recognized in
congressional debates,2 and generally understood by federal, state and local enforcers. In
∗

Professor, Fordham Law School; thanks to Bill Stuntz and Dave Sklansky, and to Rick Pildes, Stephen
Holmes, and their NYU Center on Law and Security Colloquium for helpful feedback.
1
See Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904,1912 (2000) (reading statute to avoid the constitutional
question that would arise were “’traditionally local criminal conduct’” to be made “a matter for federal
enforcement’”) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971); United States v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 1740 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2

See, e.g. 116 Cong. Rec. 35217 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt) (noting concern that RICO statute
would “mov[e] large substantive areas formerly totally with the police power of the state into the federal
realm”).
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the 1960s, however, a long story of federal involvement began. I use the term
“involvement,” rather than “intervention,” to signal my neutrality in this area. As I said
before, “it is futile and unnecessary to look for some a priori constitutional divide that []
puts street crime outside federal bounds.”3 Although, as will be seen, this talk has some
important normative aspects, much of the story is strictly positive.
The story starts with Barry Goldwater’s acceptance speech at the 1964
Republican convention, when the nominee seized on public crime concerns and made the
“violence in our streets” a focus of his presidential campaign.4 Goldwater lost big, but in
1965, the Johnson Administration addressed these concerns by establishing the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice and by
getting passage of the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965.5 As Malcolm Feeley
and Austin Sarat’s valuable study explains, the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance,
created to administer the grants authorized by this Act, “legitimized the view that the fed
government should provide financial assistance to state and local law enforcement.”6
And thereafter, the President’s Commission “proposed that the federal government
become an active partner in combating crime at the state and local levels.”7
The primary activity of this new partner, however, was simply writing checks.
For despite all the rhetoric of planning and coordination, that’s what the federal
government’s new role amounted to.8 When in 1967, anticipating (quite correctly) that
street crime would be a critical issue in the 1968 election, the Johnson Administration
sought to create a larger scale grants program, House Republicans successfully demanded
that funding be given as block-grants to the states.9 And without adequate means to
target and monitor expenditures, the new Law Enforcement Assistance Administration10
became not a force for crime-policy innovation but simply a way of increasing funding to
the status quo.
The LEAA story is usually told as one of policy failure. And that it was, from the
perspective of those looking for improved crime policies and reduced crime rates.11 But
3

Daniel C. Richman, “Project Exile” and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 Ariz.
L. Rev. 369, 404 (2001).
4
See Malcolm M. Feeley & Austin D. Sarat, The Policy Dilemma: Federal Crime Policy and the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration 35 (U Minn Press, 1980).
5

Id. at 36.
Id.
7
Id. at 38.
8
See John J. DiIulio, Jr. et al., The Federal Role in Crime Control, in Crime (James Q. Wilson & Joan
Petersilia, eds.) 445, 454 (1995) (“[T]he LEAA was designed and functioned basically as a check-writing
machine for channeling federal dollars to state and local govts .”).
9
See Feeley & Sarat, supra note __, at 42-46.
6

10

The LEAA was established in Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351.
See DiIuilio, supra note __, at 455; Feeley & Sarat, supra note __, at __; Robert F. Diegelman, Federal
Financial Assistance for Crime Control: Lessons of the LEAA Experience, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
994 (1982).

11

2

from the perspective of state and local enforcement agencies eager for federal dollars
without federal mandates, the LEAA was surely a success that only improved with time.
Its budget kept increasing, at least until 1977.12 And the bureaucratic steps that stood
between agencies, particularly large police forces, and their money were only reduced.13
But the LEAA soon fell out of favor in Washington, attacked by Jimmy Carter for
wasting money, and finally phased out by Ronald Reagan in 1982. As Philip Heymann
and Mark Moore put it: “[S]tarting in the 1980s, the federal role in financing state and
local efforts was de-emphasized in favor of reasserting a direct federal operational role in
dealing with crime. LEAA was declared a failure, its name changed, its authorization
narrowed, its appropriations slashed, and its bureaucratic status reduced – the public
equivalent of a corporate bankruptcy.”14
Many of the criminal statutes needed to support this “direct federal operational
role” were already on the books by 1980: drug trafficking offenses, gun offenses, and
racketeering laws. And, in any event, more were soon passed by legislators eager to
show their commitment to the Wars on Crime and Drugs.15 What really changed in the
1980s, however, was the readiness of the federal government to commit investigative and
adjudication resources to street crime, and to pay for the incarceration of convicted
offenders.
It is hard fully to quantify the degree to which federal enforcers in the 1980s
moved into what hitherto had been local cases. The number of drug cases certainly
climbed.16 But that number includes both higher and lower level trafficking offenses.
And while, as we increasingly see,17 federal weapons charges can be used against street
criminals, the large number of federal weapons prosecutions brought during this period18
could have had other targets as well. By the 1990s, however, efforts by both the Bush(I)
and Clinton administrations to raise the visibility of federal enforcement operations
against street criminals made the extent of federal activity quite clear.
12

See Diluilio, supra note __, at 454.
Diegelman, supra note __, at 998-99 ( in early 1970s: “Congressional tinkering with the [Safe Streets]
Act focused on adjustment in the roles of states, major cities, and counties. Statutory and administrative
changes gradually attempted to guarantee to the larger jurisdictions a role in planning and decisionmaking
in what had been an almost totally state-directed program.”).
14
Philip B. Heymann & Mark H. Moore, The Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime:
Principles, Questions, and Cautions, 543 Annals of Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 103, 107 (1996).
13

15

See Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcment, in 2
Boundary Changes in Criminal Justice Organizations, 108 (Nat’l Inst. of Justice ed., 2000); see also
Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 Hastings L. J.
1135 (1995).

16

Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dep’t of Justice, Federal Criminal Case Processing, 1982-93, at 2 (May
1996) (number of suspects prosecuted in federal court for drug offenses goes from 9906 in 1982 to 25,094
in 1990), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fccp93.pdf.
17
See Richman, Project Exile, supra note __.
18
Federal Criminal Case Processing, supra note __, at 2 (number of suspects prosecuted in federal court for
weapons offenses goes from 1970 in 1982 to 12,168 in 1990).
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The nouns fly fast and furious here. “Project Triggerlock,” announced in 1991 by
Attorney General Thornburgh, asked U.S. Attorneys to work with local police forces to
identify repeat and violent offenders who used guns and to prosecute them in federal
court.19 In January 1992, the FBI announced its “Safe Street Violent Crimes Initiative,”
focusing on “violent gangs, crimes of violence, and the apprehension of violent
fugitives.”20 In August 1992, ATF announced “Operation Achilles Heel,” and pledged to
work with state and local authorities to round up 600 “of this nation’s most violent
criminals.”21 During the summer of 1992, the chief of the Criminal Division in the FBI’s
New York office told some agents that “terrorism was dead,” and tried to move them
away from investigating the group later responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, and into urban gang investigations.22 The change in presidential
administrations did not significantly alter the trajectory of federal enforcement policy in
this area, or the desire to highlight it. In 1994, Vice President Gore and Attorney General
Reno announced the Anti-Violent Crime Initiative. And while there was sustained debate
on Capitol Hill about the Clinton Administration’s approach to gun crimes, the only real
issue was whether the federal interest in pursuing these offenses could be served by
federally sponsored state prosecutions as well as federal prosecutions (as the Clinton
Administration wanted) or whether only federal prosecutions would do (as Republican
opponents suggested).23 Between 1989 and 1998, the number of federal firearms
prosecutions went up 61%.24 And by 2000, the FBI could boast of having deployed Safe
Streets Task Forces that included 805 FBI special agents, 251 other federal agents, and
1,096 state and local law enforcement participants (whose overtime the Bureau paid
for).25
The efforts by the Bush(I) and Clinton administrations to deploy federal agents
and prosecutors against violent crime – either on their own or in various joint task forces
– did not come at the expense of federal grants to state and local governments in this area.
Indeed, both in their dollar amounts and in the discretion they gave to state and local
enforcers, federal grant programs took off during the 1990s. The Crime Control Act of
199026 authorized $900 million for the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law
Enforcement Assistance programs – which funded narcotics enforcement and were
administered by the states.27 With the election of Bill Clinton, and in the wake of his
campaign promise to put 100,000 new police officers on the streets came the Violent

19

Project Exile, supra note __, at 374.
FBI, Safe Street Violent Crime Initiative Report, FY 2000, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/safestreets/ssgu00.pdf
21
Project Exile, supra note __,at 375.
22
John Miller, et al, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It 84 (2003).
23
Project Exile, supra note __.
24
Patrick Walker and Pragati Patrick, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Trends in Firearms Cases from
Fiscal Year 1989 through 1998, and the Workload Implications for the U.S. District Courts (Apr. 4, 2000),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/firearms/firearms00.html.
25
See FBI, Street Violent Crime Initiative Report, FY 2000, supra note __, at 2-3.
26
Pub. L. 101-647.
27
See Garrine P. Laney, Crime Control Assistance through the Byrne Programs, CRS Report, 97-265 GOV
(updated May 20, 1998).
20
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Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,28 which “authorized the spending of a
staggering $30 billion to help State and local enforcement agencies fight crime over the
6-year life of the bill’s coverage.”29 The big development here was a readiness – in the
form of the COPS (“Community Oriented Police Services”) programs to put money
directly into the hand of local police departments, and in particular big city police
departments.30 By 1997, local crime prevention took a bigger slice of the Justice
Department’s budget than the FBI, DEA, or INS. In fact, among all Justice components,
only the Bureau of Prisons got more than the units that funneled money to state and local
enforcers.31
How dependent did state and local governments become on this federal
assistance? The answer eludes easy quantification.32 Yet in California, where the annual
expenditures on law enforcement agencies ranged between $7 and 8.7 billion in 199598,33 the Legislative Analysis Office could report that the agencies had received “almost
$343 million through the COPS program” between 1995 and 1997, “almost $72 million
in block grants” in 1997 alone, and could expect “almost $50 million” in Byrne grants for
1998.34 And it advised that, given this influx of federal funds to state police agencies, the
Legislature need to determine “whether state funds for law enforcement [could] be
reduced or redirected to other parts of the criminal justice system that have not received
new federal monies.”35
This is not the place to debate whether these federal grant programs achieved or
even furthered their stated goal of crime reduction. I don’t even want to venture into the
controversy of how many more cops ended up patrolling the streets.36 From the
28

Pub. L. 103-322; also see JoAnne O’Bryant, Crime Control: The Federal Response, CRS (updated Mar.
5, 2003) (order code 1B10095).
29
Jeffrey Roth, et al., National Evaluation of the COPS Program – Title I of the 1994 Crime Act, at 41
(National Institute of Justice) (NCJ 183643, Aug. 2000).
30
Id. at 10 (of all agencies awarded grants under the COPS program by end of 1997 “only 4% served core
city jurisdictions. But they received 40% of COPS dollar awards for all programs combined and 62% of all
COPS MORE [“Making Officer Redeployment Effective”] funds (which went to technology, civilians, and
overtime”); see also id. at 65 (“On both the per capita and per crime bases, mean awards to core cities were
highest in the Middle Atlantic region and lowest in the West South Central region.”).
31
Lawrence W. Sherman, et al., Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising, A
Report to the U.S. Congress, prepared for NIJ, at 1-11 (Feb. 1997), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/works/index.htm
32

See Richard P. Nathan, State and Local Governments under Federal Grants: Toward a Predictive Theory,
98 Pol. Sci. Q. 47 (1983).
33
Calif. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Justice Fiscal Expenditures, available at
http://justice.hdcdojnet.state.ca.us/cjsc_stats/prof01/00/10.htm.
34

State of California, Legislative Analyst’s Office, Analysis of the 1998-99 Budget Bill Criminal Justice
Cross-Cutting Issues, at 19-20, available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_1998/crim_justice_crosscutting_anl98.html
35

Id. at 24.
Compare Office of the Inspector General, Management and Administration of the Community Oriented
Policing Services Grant Program, July 1999 (exec. summary) (audit finding inadequacies in program),
available at www.usdoj.gov/oig/au9921/9921toc.htm, with Roth, supra note __, at 56 (discussing audit),

36
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intergovernmental perspective, the only important point is that the latter part of the 1990s
marked the high-water mark of a federal-state-local relationship, based on violent crime
enforcement, that (surprise, surprise) nicely served the interests of all most of the
governmental actors involved. Presidential administrations of both parties got to tout
their commitment to the Fight against Crime and the War on Drugs. Legislators, who
readily appropriated large sums of money for these endeavors, could tout their
commitment as well, but there was more to it than that. For the essence of the violent
crime targeted by the enforcement and funding programs discussed here was local.
While there was much talk, and perhaps some reality, of coordination, innovation, and
“best practices,” the thrust of these programs was to deploy federal dollars and manpower
against local problems. And with each conspicuous deployment, be it funding grant or
enforcement program, a legislator’s press release could take some credit. Congressional
representatives could also take credit for relieving local enforcers of burdensome grant
compliance.37 The interests of Federal enforcement agencies were also well served by
the new violent crime priorities. The general public was happy to see the “feds”
deployed against local bad guys – street gangs, armed robbers, and murderers. And the
championship of these cases by local legislative delegations could only redound to the
benefit of agencies at funding time, and to field offices in their relations with
headquarters. The timing for the FBI was particularly propitious, as the end of the Cold
War allowed the redeployment of agents from counterintelligence to anti-violence
assignments.38 Even better, was the extent of federal enforcement discretion in this area.
There may have been political pressure to do violent crime cases. But there was little
pressure to any particular case. Violent crime was still, after all, primarily a local
responsibility. Federal agencies thus could be quite strategic in their case selection
decisions.
Local enforcers welcomed the federal enforcement and funding assistance. The
Supreme Court might bemoan federal intrusion into a traditionally local domain.39 But
local enforcers had less interest in airy notions of dignity and accountability, and more in
direct grants, overtime pay, and the aid-in-kind that federal enforcement activity – and
with See David B. Muhlhausen, Why the Bush Administration Is Right on COPS, Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder #1647 (Apr. 23, 2003) (scathing attack on COPS program), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Crime/bg1647.cfm; see also Office of the Comptroller, City of New
York, The State of the City’s Economy and Finances, 16 (Dec. 26, 2003) (noting that New York City used
COPS money to hire about 3500 police officers between 1997 and 2000), available at
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bud/reports/stateofthecity2002.pdf.
37
See John E. Chubb, The Political Economy of Federalism, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 994, 1005 (1985)
(“Congressional pressures [] can cut a bureaucracy in two ways: with general signals for stronger or weaker
enforcement [of spending regulations], and with selective constituency-specific signals to ensure
compliance or provide regulatory relief.”).
38
See David Johnston, FBI to Shift from Cold War to Crime War, N. Y. Times, Jan 9, 1992, at __. Note
that given what we know about counterintelligence weaknesses during this period, see Mark Reibling,
Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11, How the Secret War Between the FBI and CIA Has Endangered
National Security, the Bureau’s confidence may have been misplaced. See also Office of the Inspector
General, Dep’t of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating
the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen (Aug. 2003) (unclassified executive summary), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/03-08/final.pdf.
39
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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the significant procedural and sentencing advantages flowing therefrom -- really
amounted to.40 After all, despite the occasional turf-battle, the fact is that federal
agencies can rarely do violent crime cases without the help of the local police, who alone
control “the informational networks on which federal law enforcement agencies must rely
when pursuing episodic criminal activity.”41 So although judges decried the flood of
“state” cases into federal court,42 and defendants who expected to be prosecuted in state
court, complained when they were somewhat arbitrarily selected out for harsher federal
sentences,43 state and law enforcers could and did look on this federal “intrusion” with
equanimity, and sometimes even glee.
This decade of direct grants, block grants, and enforcement assistance from the
federal government to state and local authorities did not come to an end with the election
of George W. Bush. With great fanfare, the new President announced an “Initiative to
Reduce Gun Violence,” and, as he had in his campaign, embraced a program of maximal
federal involvement in gun violence prosecutions.44 And in a May 2001 memo to
department heads, Attorney General Ashcroft included, as two of his seven goals,
“reducing drug violence and drug trafficking,” and “helping states with anti-crime
programs.” He did not even mention terrorism.45 To be sure, the new Administration
announced plans to phase out the COPS program46– not that surprising, given that
Republicans had long questioned of the efficacy of this Clinton program that tended to
funnel most of its money to big city Democratic strongholds.47 But the plan envisioned a
reconfiguring of federal aid in the violent crime area, not a transfer away from it.48
40

See Gerald R. Murphy & Martha R. Plotkin, Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: The Strategies
for Local Law Enforcement Series, Vol. I: Improving Local-Federal Partnerships, Mar. 2003, at 50 (Police
Executive Research Forum & Community Oriented Policing Services, Dept of Justice) (police chief notes
that many chiefs like FBI to do drug, bank robbery & violent crime cases. “We want it both ways.”); see
also Daniel Richman, Boundaries, supra note __, at 95.
41
Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46
UCLA L. Rev. 757, 785 (1999).
42
See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
749, 795 (2003) (collecting cites).
43
See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 643
(1997).
44
See Remarks by President George W. Bush and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Initiative to
Reduce Gun Violence, May 14, 2001 (Federal News Service). See also Project Safe Neighborhoods
website, http://www.psn.gov/
45

Adam Clymer, How Sept. 11 Changed Goals of Justice Dept., N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 2002, at __.
Ashcroft did mention terrorism when testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee in April 2001,
but his focus there too was on violent crime. See Jerry Seper, Justice Budget Targets Drug Use, Gun
Crimes, Attacks on Women, Wash. Times, Apr. 27, 2001, at A5; see also Joint Intelligence Committee
Report, ____ (“An FBI budget official told the Joint Inquiry that counterterrorism was not a priority for
Attorney General (John) Ashcroft before Sept. 11, and the FBI faced pressure to make cuts in
counterterrorism to satisfy his other priorities.”).
46
See Jim Oliphant, DOJ Trims State Funds, Legal Times, Apr. 16, 2001, at 18.
47
As far back as 1995, one part of the Republican Contract with America, proposed in H.R. 3, 104th Cong.,
st
1 sess. (1995), would have eliminated the COPS program in favor of a block-grant program See Philip B.
Heymann & Mark H. Moore, The Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime: Principles,
Questions, and Cautions, 543 Annals of Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 103, __ (1996).
48
Oliphant, supra note __.
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Then came the attacks on September 11, 2001.
The Post-9/11 Dynamic
We are often told that September 11 “changed everything.” Perhaps this is an
overstatement in some contexts. But I believe the assessment dead on when applied to
the federal, state and local law enforcement dynamic.
The shock to the federal enforcement bureaucracy was extraordinary. Before this,
there were a few specialized “beats” that the feds had to patrol.49 But the system’s
defining luxury was the absence of any responsibility to pursue any particular case in
most of the areas in which it had jurisdiction. Now, all of a sudden, it was saddled with a
politically unavoidable,50 and all-but-impossible responsibility: preventing another such
attack.
To their credit, federal enforcement officials made a concerted effort to reach out
to state and local agencies for intelligence-gathering assistance, and diplomatically
sought to address long-standing local complaints about the feds’ reluctance to share
information. FBI Director Mueller made conciliatory speeches,51 and created a new
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination, headed by a former police chief, within the
FBI.52 Attorney General Ashcroft announced the creation of Anti-Terrorism Task Forces
within each district, and set up mechanisms for these units to coordinate with state and
local authorities.53 (These “task forces,” with their outreach function, are not to be
49

See Richman, Federal Criminal Law, supra note __, at 766.
See Edward J. Tully (retired FBI agent – 31 yrs service) & E.L. (Bud) Willoughby (retired chief, Salt
Lake City police), Terrorism: The Role of Local and State Police Agencies, website: National Executive
Institute Association, Major Cities Chiefs Assn & Major County Sheriff’s [sic] Association, at 7 (May
2002) (-If you are mayor or chief of police in a major city, “Your unquestioned legal responsibility is to
provide safety and security to your citizens. In reality, however, you have sub-contracted this protection to
the federal government and its various agencies.”), available at
http://www.neiaassociates.org/state-local.htm (accessed June 2, 2003); see also Gov’t Accounting Office.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to be Strengthened, GAO-03-760, at 7
(Aug. 2003) ("Preventing the United States from terrorism has traditionally been a responsibility of the
federal government and, typically, the views of states and cities in formulating national policy have not
been considered").
50

51

Remarks by Robert S. Mueller III, Director, FBI, at the Mayors Emergency, Safety, and Security Summit
United States Conference of Mayors,October 24, 2001, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/mayors.htm; Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Robert S. Mueller III,
Director, FBI, at the Annual Meeting of the Police Executive Research Forum, May 9, 2002, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech050902.htm
52
FBI, Press Release, Apr. 11, 2002, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/mueller041102.htm
53
Dept. of Justice. Fact Sheet: Overview of Information Sharing Initiatives in the War on Terrorism,
available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/020923overview.pdf;
Memorandum of Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft to All U.S. Attorneys, Cooperation with State and Local
Officials in the Fight Against Terrorism, Nov. 13, 2001, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/agdirective5.pdf; see also Century Foundation: Steven D. Stehr,
Homeland Security in the State of Washington: A Baseline Report on the Activities of State and Local
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confused with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which have more of an operational
role.)54 The Office of Homeland Security and, after the up-grade, the Department of
Homeland Security also sought to facilitate intergovernmental cooperation.55
These moves all testified to the new intergovernment intelligence dynamic.
Given the nature of the perceived terrorist threat – the sleeper cells waiting to strike
again56---- federal agencies now relied on the intelligence capabilities of local police
forces in a way they never did when the primary area of interaction was violent crime.
Back then, the feds needed help from the locals, but since they could walk away from any
case and had could offer many benefits, they had considerable leverage. Now, the rush
was on to create the semblance of a national intelligence network providing what Philip
Heymann has called “untargeted prevention.”57 And, in this, the participation of local
cops was absolutely essential.
What state and local enforcers bring to the counterterrorism intelligence-gathering
process is not simply a function of their numbers – 638,066 state and local police officers
compared to 88,496 federal law enforcement officers (more than a quarter of whom were
in the Federal Bureau of Prisons) in 1999-200058 – nor even of the many things they learn
Govts at 24 (2003) (purpose of the Anti-Terrorism Task Force “is to centralize the process by which
information relevant to the investigation and prosecution of terrorists can be shared with state and local
officials.”).
54

See Richard B. Schmitt & Greg Krikorian, Foot Soldiers on the Homeland Security Front; The FBI is
Relying on Task Forces of Federal, State and Local Law Enforcement Officials, L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 2003,
at 18. The likelihood of confusion between the two different “task forces,” may explain why the Justice
Department recently changed the name of the “Anti-Terrorism Task Forces,” to “Anti-Terrorism Advisory
Councils.” See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, “Attorney General John Ashcroft Announces Changes to
Anti-Terrorism Task Forces, Sept. 25, 2003. available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_528.htm.
55

See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
749, 769 n. 83 (2003).

56

See Karen DeYoung, “Sleeper Cells” Of Al Qaeda Are Next Target; U.S. to Focus on Terror Threat As
Afghan Effort Winds Down, Wash. Post, Dec. 3, 2001, at A1.

57

See Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society
80-82 (MIT Press 1998) (comparing “targeted prevention” – where subjects & plans are known -- with
“untargeted prevention” – whose “purpose is to make it more risky and difficult to carry out a bombing or
other terrorist act and thereby to reduce that level of terrorist events by, at a minimum, increasing the time,
expense, and effort for each, and perhaps also reducing what may be a very limited total pool of
participants by discouraging beginner, increasing defections, and incapacitating the firmly committed.”);
see also National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002) (stating goal of “build[ing] a national
environment that enables the sharing of essential homeland security information horizontally across each
agency of the federal government and vertically among federal, state, and local governments, private
industry, and citizens”).
58

See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001, at 33, tbl. 1.22; Brian A. Reeves & Timothy C. Hart,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2000, at 8 (July 2001). The years given are
the last for which state and local data are available. The number of federal officers climbed to 93,446 by
June 2002. Brian A. Reeves & Lynn M. Bauer, Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2002, at 8 (Aug. 2003).

9

while on street patrol. It also stems from their involvement in bringing the bulk of
serious criminal charges in the United States,59 because the threat of prosecution (even
prosecutions having nothing to do with terrorism) is one of best tools around for prying
loose closely held information. Their order maintenance and public safety duties also
give local police a more balanced “portfolio” in dealing with community leaders. The
police officer who seeks information from a local Arab-American community leader has
probably met, and assisted that leader before.60
The Justice Department quickly went beyond vague talk of “information sharing”
and asked for local assistance in a large-scale program to interview thousands of people
(mostly young Middle Eastern males) in the country on non-immigrant visas.61 In the
Spring of 2002, the Department went further and announced its plan to place of names of
certain aliens who had violated their visa requirements into the national database of
wanted suspects. It asked state and local police to arrest these “absconders,” and noted
that, as a legal matter, such assistance was “within the inherent authority of the states.”62
59

In 2001, there were an estimated 13,699,254 arrests in the U.S., , including 2,245,597 for index crimes.
See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, tbl. 4.1 (“Estimated number of arrests”). Between
Oct. 1, 2000, and Sept. 30, 2001, 118,896 suspects were arrested on federal charges and processed by
federal marshals. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Criminal Case Processing, 2001, tbl. 1, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fccp01.pdf.
60
See Murphy & Plotkin, supra note __, at 43 “Local law enforcement can facilitate information gathering
among community groups with whom they have good relationships. Community advisory boards that
include Arab and Muslim members, for example, can be brought together for meetings with the FBI to
provide information.”); Siobhan Gorman, National Journal, Mar. 29, 2003 (Director of Detroit American
Arab Chamber of Commerce notes “that while the local Police Department has worked to win the Arab
community's trust and has Arab-Americans within its ranks, the FBI and other federal law enforcement
agencies haven't done enough to establish trust. Last week, after the war broke out, the Wayne County
sheriff dispatched his forces to guard mosques here. ‘There weren't any incidents or any problems in the
area,’ said Mohammad Ali Elahi, the imam at the Islamic House of Wisdom here. ‘The interaction between
authorities and community has been very fruitful.’”); Maryanne George, Criticism After Sept. 11: Words
from Police Chief in Spotlight, Detroit Free Press, Dec. 4, 2001, at __ (chief of Ann Arbor, Mich., police
notes that leaders of local Arab-American community had asked that officer from his force be present
during post 9/11 FBI interviews of Arab-Americans).
61

See Allan Lengel, Arab Men in Detroit to be Asked to See U.S. Attorney, Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 2001, at
A5; Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1413, 141718 (2002; Memorandum from the Attorney General to All U.S. Attorneys; All Members of the AntiTerrorism Task Forces, Interviews Regarding International Terrorism, Nov. 9, 2001, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/terrorism1.htm; Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to
All U.S. Attorneys; All Members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces, Guidelines for the Interviews
Regarding International Terrorism, Nov. 9, 2001, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/readingrooms/terrorism2.htm.
62

As Attorney General Ashcroft explained when announcing the “National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System,” June 6, 2002, http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/preparedremarks.htm: “When
federal, state and local law enforcement officers encounter an alien of national security concern who has
been listed on the NCIC for violating immigration law, federal law permits them to arrest that individual
and transfer him to the custody of the INS. “The Justice Department''s Office of Legal Counsel has
concluded that this narrow, limited mission that we are asking state and local police to undertake
voluntarily -- arresting aliens who have violated criminal provisions of Immigration and Nationality Act or
civil provisions that render an alien deportable, and who are listed on the NCIC —— is within the inherent
authority of the states. The Department of Justice has no plans to seek additional support from state and
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Before focusing on the local response to these particular federal initiatives, one
should note that the predominant response of local police forces to the federal calls for
assistance in the War on Terror was to line up at the recruiting station and complain about
delays. Big city police forces moved to relax the intelligence gathering restrictions that
had been imposed in the wake of abuses in the 1960s and 1970s.63 And the constant
drumbeat from police departments during 2002 and into 2003 was that the feds weren’t
sharing information with the locals, weren’t putting them “’in the game.’”64
Some police officials strategically pivoted off calls for counterterrorism
intelligence gathering and called for the creation of a more general criminal intelligencesharing plan, to be superintended by the locals. A 2002 intelligence summit of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police produced a “vision” “in which state and
local agencies are not merely adjuncts to a national strategy for improving intelligence
communication, but founding partners of and driving participants in any organization that
helps coordinate the collection, analysis, dissemination and use of criminal intelligence
data in the U.S.”65
That said, conditions were not altogether propitious for police cooperation. In a
number of cities and states (by July 2003, 3 states and 165 local governments), officials

local law enforcement in enforcing our nation's immigration laws, beyond our narrow anti-terrorism
mission.”); see also Cheryl W. Thompson, INS Role for Police Considered; U.S. Eyes State, Local Help in
Enforcing Immigration Laws, Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 2002, at A15.
63

See Handschu v. Special Services Division, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2134 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ruling on
efforts of N.Y. Police Department to relax guidelines governing investigation of political activity; Michael
Powell, Domestic Spying Pressed; Big-City Police Seek to Ease Limits Imposed After Abuses Decades
Ago, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 2002, A1 (“In Chicago, officials have already weakened a court decree limiting
police spying. In San Francisco, officials have reversed their own 1997 decision and have now joined an
FBI terrorism task force, even though FBI surveillance of mosques and peaceful protests could violate the
California constitution.”).
64

Murphy & Plotkin, supra note __, 9 (complaints by local officials that, for FBI, information sharing is
only one-way); id. at 29 (more than year after attacks, local law enforcement executives “do not feel like
they are in the game.” (commentary by Edward A. Flynn, Sec. of Public Safety for Massachusetts, former
Chief of Arlington Co. (Va) Police Department); id. at 33 (complaints by local officials that FBI does not
take them up on offers of resources); Tully & Willoughby, supra note __, at 7 (“state and local officials
should demand respect and equality when dealing with federal agencies. Withholding information, making
unilateral decisions, or ignoring the legitimate concerns of local officials by federal officials should be
deemed unacceptable. When state and local officers participate in joint task forces they should do so only
on the condition that they are treated as equals and that their superiors are fully information about matters
of critical importance.”). See also Gov’t Accounting Office. Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve
Information Sharing Need to be Strengthened, GAO-03-760, at 18 (Aug. 2003) (noting state and local
complaints in 2002 about insufficient federal information sharing, and finding “little change” a year later).
65

Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing at the Local, State and
Federal Levels: Recommendations from the IACP Intelligence Summit, at 2 (Aug. 2002): available at
http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/intelsharingreport.pdf.
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took stands (pretty symbolic, to be sure66) against the Administration’s counter-terrorism
efforts. The town of Arcata (population 16,000) barred its officials from assisting in
investigations carried out under the USA Patriot Act; officials who don’t tell the city
manager when contacted by federal authorities pursuing investigations under the Act are
to be fined $57.67 The Seattle city council reaffirmed its support for an ordinance
limiting the ability of local police to gather or share information on religious or political
groups.”68 Some stands were more than symbolic. In December 2001, notwithstanding
opinions to contrary by the Oregon attorney general and local district attorney, the
Portland City Attorney announced that state law – barring police police from “detecting
or apprehending” people who have violated only fed immigration law, and from
collecting info on political, social or religious beliefs unless it pertains to a criminal
investigation – prohibited Portland police from asking some of the 33 questions that the
Justice Department wanted posed to 23 foreigners in area.69
Some of this scattered resistance may have arisen from partisan politics or liberal
reflexes. But there was a historical basis as well, for the federal efforts to recruit local
police into a national intelligence network brought back memories of 1968, when the feds
had urged the locals to create "’intelligence units" to gather and disseminate information
on "potential" civil disorders.’”70 The Church Committee later recounted the result of
these efforts: “Local police intelligence provided a convenient manner for the FBI to
acquire information it wanted while avoiding criticism for using covert techniques such
as developing campus informants. For example, in 1969, Director Hoover decided "that
additional student informants cannot be developed" by the Bureau. Field offices were
instructed, however, that one way to continue obtaining intelligence on "situations having
a potential for violence" was to develop "in-depth liaison with local law enforcement
agencies. " Instead of recruiting student informants itself, the FBI would rely on local
police to do so.” “These Federal policies contributed to the proliferation of local police
66

See Michael Riley, Denver Post, Limits on Terror Fight Eyed, Mar. 15, 2002, at A1 (reporting police as
saying that “most rank and file police work is unlikely to be affected by the resolution.” “’The FBI rarely
asks us for help. They don’t need to,’ said David Nell, president of the Denver police union. ‘This is about
as relevant as the nuclear-free zone in Boulder.’”).
67
Guy Taylor, Communities Shun Patriot Act, Wash. Times, July 21, 2003, at __; Richard Lacayo, The
War Comes Back Home; Can Attorney General John Ashcroft Fight Terrorism on Our Shores Without
Injuring Our Freedoms?, Time Magazine, May 12, 2003 (“Nearly 100 towns and counties, plus the state of
Hawaii, have passed resolutions condemning the USA Patriot Act….”).; see also Scott Martelle, New
Breed of Patriots Speaking Up; Grass-roots Efforts to Rein In the Anti-Terrorist USA Patriot Act Gain
Support, LA Times, Dec. 8, 2002, at 24: Michael Janofsky, Cities Urge Restraint in Fight Against Terror,
NY Times, Dec. 23, 2002. For a list of cities, see http://www.bordc.org/Chronology.pdf
68

See Jim Brunner, Seattle Council Takes Aim at USA Patriot Act, Seattle Times, Feb. 19, 2003, at B3
(noting the passage of similar resolutions in Oakland, San Francisco, Detroit, Denver, and Cambridge,
Mass.).
69

See AP, Portland Chief Denies City Not Cooperating, Seattle Times, Dec. 3, 2001, at __.

70

Church Committee Report: Intelligence Activities and Rights of Americans, Bk. II, Final Report of the
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, at
332-33 (Apr. 26, 1976), available at http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIb.htm
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intelligence activities, often without adequate controls. One result was that still more
persons were subjected to investigation who neither engaged in unlawful activity, nor
belonged to groups which might be violent.”71 All this was not ancient history to local
authorities in places like Denver, which in 2002 was still negotiating a settlement with
the ACLU relating to abuses by the police intelligence bureau, and New York City,
where a consent degree arising out of similar abuses is still in place.72
Local concerns were not merely partisan, philosophical or historical. They also
grew out of local politics. When the federal-local interaction was centered on violent
crime, federal initiatives brought significant positive externalities – credit for local
leaders and maybe even improved local safety. The counterterrorism dynamic has been
precisely the reverse (with some important exceptions, e.g. NYC). There is no reason to
expect that terrorists pose a particular threat to the many of the places where they or
information about them will be found. (Detroit is a great example.) In those areas, the
gains from domestic intelligence gathering thus are felt primarily, even exclusively at the
national level. But the costs of gathering fall on the localities. And I am not even talking
about the fiscal cost right now, but rather to the significant negative externalities that
attend any large-scale investigations of immigrant activities in communities that have
large numbers of immigrants.
Police department, of course, don’t always share the concerns of their political
masters. But police officials have had their own pragmatic concerns about federal
counterterrorism initiatives, particularly those involving the use of federal immigration
statutes. As the “chief counsel’s column” on the website of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police explained in the Fall of 2002:
[E]nforcement of civil immigration laws by local law enforcement would have a
chilling effect on both legal and illegal aliens reporting criminal activity or
assisting police in criminal investigations. Local police want illegal aliens to come
forward when they have been the victims of, or witnesses to, crimes. Police
depend on the cooperation of immigrant communities to help them solve all sorts
of crimes and to maintain public order. Without the assurances that they will not
be deported, many illegal immigrants with critical information would not come
forward.”73
71

Id. at 332-35 (??).

72

See Handshu v. Special Services Div., supra note __; Ford Fessenden & Michael Moss, Going
Electronic, Denver Reveals Long-Term Surveillance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2002, at A12; Mike McPhee,
“Spy files” Shared with FBI, Others; Feds Say Information From Denver Deleted, May 16, 2003, at A27;
Kevin Vaughan, Police Will Still Gather Intelligence; But “Spy Files” Settlement Places Restrictions on
How It Can Be Done, Rocky Mountain News, Apr. 18, 2003, at A12; Michael Riley, Denver Post, Limits
on Terror Fight Eyed, Mar. 15, 2002, at A1.
73

Craig E. Ferrell Jr. (“Deputy Director, Administrative General Counsel, Chief's Command Legal Services,
Houston, Texas, Police Department”) The War on Terror’s “Absconder Initiative,” (“Chief Counsel’s

Column,” website of The International Association of Chiefs of Police), dated 10/1/02; SEN JUD COMM
HEARINGS FOR 9/03 CANCELLED. ADD CITES IF/WHEN HEARINGS HELD.
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A Georgia police chief recalled that, after police had taken part in several INS
raids to round up illegal immigrants in the early 1990s, “[v]ery quickly, people in the
community associated us with the INS. That’s exactly what you don’t want.” He called
the Justice Department’s proposal “a horrible idea.”74 Other police chiefs expressed
similar sentiments.75 One congressional representative recently reported on her
conversations with police officials in California “that most police chiefs and most local
law enforcement agencies oppose the idea of having to enforce immigration laws. Some
of them oppose it because it adds an additional burden on them in trying to carry out their
local law enforcement duties. And others oppose it because they fear that that would
create a risk with the very immigrant communities that they seek assistance from or
information from in helping enforce local laws ….”76
Few non-federal enforcement officials seemed disposed to assist the feds in using
the immigration laws as a law enforcement tool, even though, as one federal official
noted, “the only barriers to executing such arrests are statutes or policies that states or
municipalities have imposed upon themselves.”77 Indeed, it’s interesting to note that
perhaps the biggest local initiative in the immigration area during this period was the
readiness to allow illegal Mexican immigrants to use identification cards issued by the
Mexican government,78 a practice that an FBI official says “poses a criminal and terrorist
74

Rick Badie, Police Uneasy About Helping Arrest Illegals; Ashcroft Favors Local Assistance, Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, Apr. 10, 2002., at 1JJ (quoting police chief of Chamblee, Ga.).

75

See Cheryl W. Thompson, INS Role for Police Considered; U.S. Eyes State, Local Help in Enforcing
Immigration Laws, Wash. Post, Apr. 4, 2002, at A15: (Chicago police official notes: “‘We have an
executive order from the mayor’s office where we don’t do anything with immigration;’” D.C. Police
Chief Charles H. Ramsey expresses “concern that using local police to enforce immigration laws would
thwart efforts to build relationships with immigrant communities.”).;Diana Marrer, Experts: Do Not Mix
INS, Police; S. Floridians Criticize Plan By Ashcroft, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla), Apr. 25, 2002, 1B
(Miami PD spokesman says “’We will not function in an INS capacity…. It’s not our job. Our job is to
solve crimes.’” Hollywood (Fla.) detective says “’police need to have the confidence of their
communities.’”); Hearing, Immigration Enforcement Since Sept. 11, 2001, Border Security & Claims
Subcomm., House Jud. Comm., FDCH Pol. Trans., May 8, 2003 (ACLU witness quotes Montgomery Cty
police chief Charles Moose: “’Now this movement by the federal government to say that they want local
police officer to become INS agents is against the core values of community policing, partnerships,
assisting people and being there to solve problems.’”). For more quotes from local law enforcement
officials and others against local enforcement of immigration laws, see
http://www.immigrationforum.org/currentissues/articles/100102_quotes.htm.

76

Hearing, Immigration Enforcement Since Sept. 11, 2001, Border Security & Claims Subcomm., House
Jud. Comm., FDCH Pol. Trans., May 8, 2003, at 21 (comments of Rep. Linda Sanchez (D-Ca.)).
77

Letter & Report of Jamie E. Brown, AAG Leg Affairs, to Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chrm.,
House Jud. Comm., May 13, 2003, at 60 (responding to Committee inquiries concerning USA Patriot Act
implementation and related matter), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/patriotlet051303.pdf.
78

See Audrey Hudson, Mexico’s ID Card Gain More Acceptance in States, Cities, Wash. Times, June 14,
2003, at A1 (“The Mexican government is convincing hundreds of local government and police
departments across the United States to accept its identification cards used by legal and illegal aliens, which
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threat.”79 The non-federal officials most disposed to assist in enforcing the immigration
laws seem to come from the state level, not the local. The New York story is revealing.
In early 2002 (if not before), James Kallstrom, the State’s “counterterrorism czar,” was
said by State Police Superintendent James McMahon, to have asked DOJ to “crosslicense local police,” to allow them to arrest undocumented immigrants. “’Everything
we’re trying to do here in this effort to prevent (terrorism) is to utilize the full resources
of 70,000 state and local cops in New York state ….’”80 Thereafter, Governor Pataki put
the plan on hold, reportedly “because of mounting opposition from civil libertarians and
immigrant groups who fear police would engage in racial profiling and harass otherwise
law-abiding people who are in the country illegally.”81 Perhaps even more revealing is
the dynamic in Maryland. There, “[m]any local police departments [], including those in
Baltimore and in Anne Arundel and Baltimore counties, generally will not report illegal
immigrants unless they have committed crimes.”82 However, “state police policy is to
information federal authorities about any suspected of being in the country illegally.”83
As of the summer of 2003, only Florida and Alabama had formally signed on to the
federal initiative, and in Alabama it appears that only state troopers are involved.84 A bill
has been introduced in the House – the “Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien
Removal Act of 2003”85 – that would require state and local authorities to enforce federal
immigration laws, on pain of losing federal funds. At an October 2003 hearing, the
critics say amounts to a backdoor amnesty for illegal aliens.”); see also Matthew Mosk, Montgomery to
Allow Consular ID Cards, Wash. Post, May 29, 2003, at A10. A bill to limit the use of these cards was
passed by the House on July 16, 2003, as part of the Foreign Operations authorization bill. See Stephen
Dinan, House Bill Restricts Consular I.D. Card, Wash. Times, July 17, 2003, at __.
79

Stephen Dinan, Mexican ID Not Valid, a “Threat,” FBI Says, Wash. Times, June 27, 2003.
Brendan Lyons, Local Police, Federal Powers; Feds Are Asked to Grant New York State’s Officers
Authority to Make Immigration Arrests, Times Union (Albany, NY), Mar. 22, 2002, at A1.

80

81

Brendon Lyons, Pataki Waits on Cop Plan; Concerns Delay Proposal to Give Police Power to Act as INS
Agents, Times Union (Albany, NY), Apr. 11, 2002, at A1; see also Susan Sachs, Mayor’s New Immigrant
Policy, Intended to Help, Raises Fears, N.Y.Times, July 23, 2003, at A1 (discussing City policies regarding
reporting of resident’s immigration status to federal authorities).
82

Jason Song, Local Police May Get Role in Immigrant Law; Federal Bill to Address Disparities Among
Agencies, Baltimore Sun, July 9, 2003, at 1B.

83

Id.

84

Hearing, Immigration Enforcement Since Sept. 11, 2001, Border Security & Claims Subcomm., House
Jud. Comm., FDCH Pol. Trans., May 8, 2003 (testimony of Michael Dougherty, Staff Dir of Operations,
Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement) )( reporting “a limited program in Florida and, perhaps, a
beginnings of a program in another one of the southern states …. The delegation of authority under Section
287(g) in the [Immigration & Nationality] act really is currently only provided in the state of Florida.”);
Rachel L. Swarns, Immigrants Feel the Pinch of Post-9/11 Laws, NY Times, June 25, 2003, at A14: “Last
month, [] about 600 Alabama state police officers sat down for their first classes in civil immigration law.
By the end of the year, officials say, a small team of local police officers there will have the power to arrest
illegal immigrants for the first time in recent memory.”); Ginny MacDonald, Trooper Authority on
Immigration Opposed Hispanic Leaders Say New Powers Could Violate Rights, Birmingham (Ala.) News,
Mar. 6, 2003.
85

H.R. 2671.
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National League of Cities expressed its opposition for what it characterized as an
“unfunded mandate,”86 and the legislation’s future remains unclear.
Why the difference between the attitudes of local police departments and their
statewide counterparts? Straightforward political differences may play a part here –
Republican governors versus more liberal urban local officials. But institutional
obligations (or the lack thereof) likely play a role as well. For it is at the local level and
particularly in big cities, that the costs imposed by the federal enforcement initiative on
relationships with immigrant communities would hit hardest.
Even had nothing else changed in the relationship between federal and local
enforcers, the new federal counterterrorism initiatives would have imposed new
intelligence gathering responsibilities on the police and arguably have made it harder to
maintain order in areas with significant immigrant populations, including most big cities.
But the costs effectively imposed on the police by the federal counterterrorism focus have
gone far beyond that because with that focus has come at the expense of federal activity
in the violent crime area. Some federal enforcement activity has continued, particularly
when it comes to bringing gun cases. For these, ATF’s involvement in the President’s
Project Safe Neighborhood will doubtless continue at a high level, now that the agency
has been transferred to the Justice Department, whose leader has long championed
maximal federal effort on this front.87 But elsewhere, there has been a clear drop-off in
federal deployment. As a Wall Street Journal report put it: “Already hard pressed by a
shaky economy and budget cuts, police departments across the country must fill the void
left by the reassigned FBI agents, investigating more bank robberies, violent crimes, and
other big cases.”88 Perhaps some FBI field offices have been “reluctant to pull out of
drug and gang investigations because they fear losing contacts with local agencies.”89
But the shift in federal priorities has taken a severe toll on the commitment of federal
enforcement resources to violent crime and narcotics investigations. In mid-June 2003, a
86

Statement of Gordon Quan on behalf of Nat’l League of Cities, House Jud. Comm., Immigration
Subcomm., Oct. 1, 2003, available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/quan100103.htm. Interestingly, no
local police official testified at this hearing.
87
See Press Release, Attorney General Announces Record Increase in Gun Prosecutions, New Resources to
Prevent and Prosecute Gun Violence, Feb. 7, 2003, available at
http://www.psn.gov/News.asp?FormMode=Release&Lang=1; Statement of Patrick J. Fitzgerald,
Concerning Combating Gang Violence, Sen. Jud. Comm., Sept. 17, 2003 (noting federal efforts to target
gang violence); States of Asst. FBI Dir.Grant D. Ashley, Sen. Jud. Comm., Sept. 17, 2003; (ADD
COLLOQUY WHEN AVAILABLE); see also Richman, Project Exile at 396 (noting Attorney General
Ashcroft’s longstanding support for federal gun enforcement projects directed against violent or predicate
offenders); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§1111-1113 (transferring ATF from
Treasury to Justice Department).
88

Gary Fields & John R. Wilke, FBI’s New Focus Places Big Burden on Local Police, Wall St. J., June 30,
2003, at 1; Laura Sullivan & Gail Gibson, DiBiagio’s FBI Letter Draws Ire of Agents; U.S. Attorney’s
Criticism Is Assailed in Light of Bureau’s Terror Emphasis, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 14, 2003, B1 (“Across the
country, such investigations have fallen increasingly to state and local law enforcement. Police chiefs have
instructed their officers to take over local bank robberies and nonterror, intelligence-gathering operations
that previously fell to the FBI.”).
89

Murphy & Plotkin, supra note __, at 43.
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GAO report found that FBI field agent non-supervisory positions charged and allocated
to investigating violent crime matters had gone down from 2000 in fiscal 2001 to 1000 in
fiscal 2003 (and even lower during Iraqi war).90 The number of FBI agents assigned to
drug cases had also gone way done, and it was not clear whether the Drug Enforcement
Administration would be filling the gap. The report noted: “The overall reduction in
combined FBI and DEA staffing of drug enforcement positions and the change in
strategy removes some drug enforcement assistance from local jurisdictions at a time
when many, if not most, state and local budgets are under intense pressure.”91
Note that the point here is not that the shift in federal resources was a mistake.
Indeed, as I’ve said elsewhere, I believe that one of the greatest benefits flowing from the
federal enforcement bureaucracy’s relative lack of political accountability is its flexibility
in responding to changing circumstances.92 And, although the system may be
overreacting to September 11, it may also be underreacting. I have no idea. What I am
suggesting, though, is that the duration and apparent stability of federal agencies’
commitment to street crime enforcement during the 1980s and 1990s set a new baseline
for local expectations of federal enforcement assistance. And these expectations now are
not being met.
A similar desire to refrain from sweeping normative judgments must also
accompany my assessment of intergovernmental relations on the fiscal front. The
economic downturn and the political popularity of tax cuts have obviously placed new
budget pressure on state and local governments in 2002-03. That pressure surely plays
critical background role in intergovernmental relations across every policy area. But the
appropriate level of government at which taxes should be raised and spent -- and how
high those taxes should be -- are not matters to which I bring any particular expertise.93
In the fiscal area, too, my focus is not on what is the right policy but on policy
expectations, and specifically on how the creation of local grievances is likely to affect
the law enforcement dynamic.
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Statement of David M. Walker, Comp. Gen., FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to
Transform, but Major Challenges Continue, Subcomm. On Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary,
House Approp. Comm., June 18, 2003 (AO-03-759T), at 35.
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Id. at 19-20; see also 2002 Annual Meeting, US Conf of Mayors, Resolution: FBI Reorganization (June
14-18) (noting that“the nation’s mayor’s and police chiefs are also concerned about continuing issues
relating to traditional crime, particularly drug-related crime, much of which originates out of city and U.S.
borders,” and asking “that the U.S. Department of Justice and FBI engage in detailed and structured
conversation with the U.S. Conf of Mayors to understand what the new structure of the FBI will mean for
the critical war against terrorism, as well as traditional law enforcement and crime fighting in this nation.”),
available at http://www.usmayors.org/uscm/resolutions/70th_conference/csj_05.asp
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See Richman, Project Exile, supra note __.
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See Richard A. Musgrave, Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition, 11 J. Econ. Perspectives 65
(1997); Roger H. Gordon, An Optimal Taxation Approach to Fiscal Federalism, 98 Q. J. Econ. 567 (1983).
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The new sensitivity to the terrorist threat has required massive expenditures at the
state and local levels.94 How much of these expenses should be borne by the federal
government has been very much a subject of political debate in 2003, with even
Homeland Security Secretary Ridge conceding that initial plans to elevate interstateequity above more fine-grained assessments of need ought to be revisited.95 In the
meantime, though, state and local governments have been forced to choose between
spending more when the federal Homeland Security color code moves up or holding
steady, relying on their own risk assessment, and assuming the risk of being wrong. To
the extent that officials have responded to federal signals, the color codes have thus
become a species of unfunded mandate.96 There may be an emerging trend of officials
who follow independent courses, but that will have its own cost to the federal
government when it comes to security coordination.97
If one source of intergovernmental tension is the overall level of federal homeland
security funding, another (perhaps even more disruptive) source of tension is the way
federal funds will be distributed. One police chief complained in a Spring 2003
congressional hearing that homeland security
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See Testimony of GAO Managing Director Paul L. Posner before the Subcomm. On Terrorism,
Technology and Homeland Security, Sen. Jud. Comm., Sept. 3, 2003, at 15 (GAO-03-1146T) [hereinafter
“Posner Testimony”] (“many local jurisdictions have taken it upon themselves to take the initiative to
dramatically increase their own-source funding in an effort to enhance security”); see also Manuel
Trajtenberg (Tel Aviv Univ. & NBER), Crafting Defense R & D Policy in the Anti-Terrorist Era (May
2003), at 18 : (strategy of “deploying resources to protect likely targets in the homeland” “makes the
provision of defense mostly a local public good, even conveying negative externalities.”).
http://www.nber.org/books/innovation4/trajtenberg5-8-03.pdf
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See Jeff Stein et al., CQ Outlook: Is Homeland Security Keeping America Safe?, CQ Weekly, June 14,
2003, at 1476 (“Ridge and many in Congress would like to tweak the [funding] formula so that while a
state minimum would remain in place, the department could direct the rest by using criteria shuch as the
likelihood that an area would be attacked and whether it had vulnerable sites such as nuclear or chemical
plants nearby.”); see also Posner Testimony, supra note __, at 14 (comparing allocation formulae of various
homeland security grant programs).
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See Century Foundation, Dennis L. Dresang, Strengthening Federal-State Relationships to Prevent and
Respond to Terrorism: Wisconsin, at 24 (2003) (“The seemingly random way in which the fed got has
changed the level of alert status has damaged the credibility and effectiveness of these message. Wisconsin
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No Change, Feb. 27, 2003, .(29% say “more guidance from the federal government is needed.)”available at
www.nlc.org/nlc/_org/site/newsroom/nations_cities_weekly/
97
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“incredible problems” creating by the changing fed alert levels, “overtime, financial, functional,” Arizona
homeland security director says that Arizona may not follow federal moves in future, particularly where
based on threats specific to other parts of country.)
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resources do not go directly to local police departments. They cannot be used to
hire new police. They cannot be used to pay overtime expenses that we incur
each and every time Secretary Ridge changes the alert level. They can be used to
purchase equipment, but not by me. I have to wait for a statewide plan to be
developed and then I have to hope that a fair share of those funds will filter to my
department.98
As a mayor put it in another hearing at around the same time: “After all, a 9-1-1
call does not get a state trooper.”99 The U.S. Conference of Mayors has (unsurprisingly)
expressed similar sentiments: “[W]e strongly believe that a majority of the [first
responders] funding must be provided directly to cities and counties to avoid delays and
ensure that our nation’s front-line troops – which are predominately at the local level –
have immediate access to flexible resources.”100 And members have suggested that
partisan politics help explain the Republican administration’s reluctance to give money
directly to urban areas.101
Given that local governments will eventually get much of the homeland security
funding, there are arguments for funneling the money through the states, and thus
encouraging statewide coordination.102 Unsurprisingly, the governors have embraced
98
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these arguments. Speaking for the National Governors Association at a Spring 2003
congressional hearing, Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney testified: “[W]e believe it
critical that homeland security funding and resources be applied against comprehensive
and integrated statewide plans.” “[T]he most critical step to maximizing our resources is
developing integrated statewide plans and channeling virtually all homeland security
funding thru these plans.” “Without statewide coordination, there is no check on gaps in
coverage, incompatible equipment and communications systems, and wasteful
duplication.”103 Less interested parties have made similar arguments.104 And, indeed,
recent years have seen some states endeavoring to be not just funding brokers but
informational intermediaries – doing more in the way of intelligence collection and
dissemination and counterterrorism training.105
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least 50% of funding to “local communities” within 45 days; no allocation yet of $700 million designated
“for use in high-density urban areas, high-threat areas, and for protection of critical infrastructure.”),
available at http://www.usmayors.org/executivedirector/cochran_050103.pdf.
103
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Security: Challenges Facing State and Local Governments, May 15, 2003, available at
http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,C_TESTIMONY^D_5449,00.html; see also Testimony
of Mich. Gov. John Engler (et al), before Senate Approp Comm. on Homeland Security Funding, Apr. 10,
2002 (“We want to emphasize how critical it is that federal homeland security funds be funneled through
the Gov or a designated state agency. The ability to coordinate thru a single agency or office is crucial if
we are to address the complexity of directing and coordinating resources towards protecting our citizens.”),
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Because they see cities as bearing the brunt (in both fiscal and political costs) of
any nationwide intelligence gathering and security patrolling effort, local officials,
particularly from bigger cities, would likely have complained about the very nature of
Bush Administration’s substantial embrace106 of the statewide funding model for
homeland security. Their sense of grievance has been intensified, however, by their
perception that it is “their” violent crime money that is now going to the states.
The fungibility of money makes the link impossible to prove. And, in the Bush
Administration’s defense, it should be noted that the COPS program has always been a
Republican target. Yet urban officials have made much of the coincidence that the COPS
program is being phased out, and other crime control grants reduced,107 just as homeland
security funding plans are being made. As one police chief recently testified: “[T]here is
a concern in the law enforcement community, that new assistance programs are being
funded at the expense of traditional law enforcement assistance programs such as the
COPS program, the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program and the Byrne Grant
program.”108 And as a mayor testifying last year on behalf of the Conference of Mayors
put it, when complaining of plans to cut COPS by 80% and transfer other monies into the
state-controlled Byrne grant program: “We must ensure that cities have the resources
needed to fight both the domestic war on terrorism and the continuing war against crime.
We cannot simply ‘Rob Peter to Pay Paul.’”109
As I write this (October 2003), the fiscal picture is still in flux (as it probably will
be for some time), with the budget wars (shocking to say) a perfect vehicle for partisan
agendas.110 Congressional Democrats have been championing the cause of urban police
departments for more COPS money, and the cause of “first responders” more generally
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(i.e. localities) a larger and more directly funded share of homeland security money.111
And the localities themselves are asserting their own pressing needs.112 For its part, the
Bush Administration is planning to reduce COPS funding from 1.4 billion to 164 million
(80% reduction), and to eliminate Byrne and LLEBG grants. Under the Homeland
Security Appropriations Bill, signed the President on October 1, 2003, $1.7 billion in
“first responder” funding to state and local governments is being distributed by DHS’s
Office of Domestic Preparedness to states – and, through them, to localities -- under a
formula-based grant program. The department has been allocated an additional $725
million for discretionary grants (again to go through states) for “high-threat, high-density
urban areas.”113
Where Next?
Regardless of the financial and political costs of intensive counterterrorist
intelligence programs, some cities can be counted to support federal efforts. Especially
cities that have bourn the brunt of what may have been insufficient federal efforts in the
past, and that see themselves high on the list of potential targets in the future. Even
without what it (and most observers) would call “adequate” federal reimbursement, New
York City has been quick to deploy its resources to the fullest, in a massive
counterterrorist program. The program certainly includes large-scale and widespread
security measures aimed at protecting the city’s most conspicuous targets. But even more
significant is the degree to which the City’s police department has extended its
intelligence collection activities.114 To be sure, there seems to be a degree of conscious
provocation in the profile that Commissioner Kelly has given to these activities – a
gauntlet challenging the feds to match the City’s efforts. Yet the available evidence
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suggests that these efforts have been well coordinated with federal agencies and have
enhanced federal capabilities.115
What about other cities – particularly a city like Detroit, which will be losing its
COPS money and federal enforcement assistance against violent crime, does not rank at
the top of the list of potential terrorist targets, and has a large Middle East immigrant
population that is both a potential source of intelligence information and of political
backlash to aggressive federal counterterrorist tactics?
There are many possible endings to this story. But I focus on two stylized
endings, one pessimistic; the other optimistic. The first presages an increasing rift
between local and federal enforcers, as the inherent collective action problem posed by
any nationwide counterterrorism effort is compounded by the use of tactics perceived as
over-aggressive in many communities and by local grievances arising out of dashed
hopes for continuing federal support against violent crime. It is of course possible that
federal enforcers will, over time, do a better job of reaching out to communities on their
own. Such efforts are indeed in progress.116 Nonetheless, the relative narrowness of
federal enforcement concerns and the (related) comparative distance of federal agencies
from the lives of people in densely populated urban communities would likely make a
federally centered intelligence gathering effort a poor substitute for a more integrated
national network.
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Those looking for more evidence of the fraught nature of federal information
gathering initiatives need only to follow the TIPS (Terrorist Information and Prevention
System) debacle. First mentioned by President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union
Speech, the program was pitched by the Justice Department as a way to enlist the
observatory powers of service providers around the nation in the War on Terror. Before
long, under pressure by many in Congress and elsewhere, the program was reconfigured
to “involve only truckers, dock workers, bus drivers and others who are in positions to
monitor places and events that are obviously public.”117 Even that was not enough, and
the initiative was soon legislated out of existence.118
There is a far more optimistic ending, though. The fiscal and operational
pressures on federal resources may preclude either the resuscitation of the violent-crime
model of intergovernmental interaction or the outright enlistment119 of state and local
governments in a federally directed counterterrorism campaign. But in place of the
violent-crime model will emerge a counterterrorism-based model that courts state and
local assistance by giving them a greater voice in how the federal government interacts
with citizens, and particularly with immigrant communities.
Secrecy obviously has its place in any counterterrorist program. And if every tip
and the planning of how it is to be followed up have to be shared with enforcers and
agencies across the nation and at every level of government, operational effectiveness
will surely be reduced (if not completely precluded). Institutional considerations
reinforce operational considerations on this point. If we want to tear down the “wall” that
has hampered cooperation between the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community
(especially the CIA) in the past, we will have to create a federal domain of very closely
held information to ensure that actual or alleged security considerations don’t become
excuses for information hoarding.
But how can the feds make sure the tips come in to begin with? This is where the
informational networks that only state and local enforcers have access to come in. And
the “price” of their participation will be a voice in federal policy-making and execution
that, in the long run, will give those processes a new degree of accountability.
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However important it is for the Federal Government to move into the terrorism
prevention business, that line of work has historically posed peculiar risks to democratic
society. Domestic intelligence operations lack the outcome measures of regular law
enforcement, have extremely low visibility because of security sensitivities, and often
involve political or potentially political judgments. The more committed an agency is to
these operations, the greater its need for political cover from the White House, which has
often been tempted to extract intelligence targeting power in return, and to use that power
for inappropriate political ends. This dynamic helps explain why the FBI – though
traditionally ready to provide political intelligence to Presidents120---- was able to resist
the pressure from Lyndon Johnson to connect antiwar protests to foreign subversion, and
the CIA was not.121 In the community policing literature, those who argue for greater
sensitivity to community preferences have to confront questions of who represents the
community, and whether the community has been adequately organized to convey its
preferences.122 When one scales up the model to the national level, however, this may be
less of an issue, as there already are institutional structures -- cities, towns, counties –
that can legitimately speak to local concerns and, while doing so, promote the gathering
of local information. Precisely how the federal interest in a national intelligence network
can be squared with demands for accountability (and consequent sensitivity) at the local
level is something that government officials in cities like Portland, Oregon, and Boise,
Idaho, have struggled to work out. In both cities, federal regulations restricting access to
intelligence information clashed with civilian oversight mechanisms.123 The contours of
120
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such local struggles will vary from place to place. But their effect on the sensitivity of
federal officials to local politics – heightened when congressional representatives take up
the causes of local officials124---- will be salutary.
Had the new demands on local enforcers not been accompanied by a broad shift
away from the violent crime model of intergovernment relationships, would local
officials have been similarly prone to push back against federal demands? As with all
such counterfactuals, this one is hard to answer. Everyone, we are told, has his price, and
presumably this applies to local officials being asked by federal authorities to assist in
times of national need. We need not answer this question, however, to say that the shift
away from the violent crime model has significantly affected these officials’ readiness to
question the fiscal and political costs that federal counterterrorism policies threaten to
impose on them. Perhaps they will be bought off in the future with a new influx of
federal money. But more likely, in this Panglossian tale, the shift in federal priorities –
and the effect of that shift on state and local officials -- will play a critical role in ensuring
that, in their new focus on counterterrorism, federal authorities do not lose sight of the
values of those they protect. Indeed, in an area where constitutional and statutory
guarantees are ill-defined and where they may not cover what many would consider to be
troubling government action,125 this developing dynamic may offer the best promise of
appropriately tempered zeal as we move into the post-9/11 era.
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